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Summary Results-based approaches play an important role in the current development-policy debate. There are two aspects to this debate: on the one hand, further improving the effectiveness of development cooperation (aid) is important to the specialists; whereas on the other hand, many donors (parliaments, the public, etc.) continue to call for the justification of aid expenditures. This creates great pressure to give the most concrete evidence for the utility of aid budgets.
There are several examples of aid debates in the past where a results-focus was implicitly or explicitly an important dimension. The discussion on any principal-agent framework, for example, links aid directly to performance and results.
The current international discussion on results-based approaches differs from debates so far in as much as in practice, aid has been frequently inputs and progress-oriented. For instance, approaches tend to be geared towards the allocation of funds for investment (e.g. to build schools) or providing advisory services (e.g. to the education sector), with no way of accounting for the success of such aid measures based on verifiable "results" (in the sense of outputs, outcomes or even impact). Success in aid is instead often recorded based on input or progress indicators, such as whether a country has raised its budget for education, or whether agreed upon reform documents (e.g. a general strategy for the education sector) have been adopted. Such an approach can indicate how the development activities in a partner country can be evaluated. But for two reasons its information value is limited: firstly, it is not always clear whether the intended results have actually been achieved. For instance, do a larger budget and the advice given really result in more pupils in schools?
What about the quality of their education? Secondly, the question arises as to what role the development aid has had in the overall situation. If results were achieved, is there a causeand-effect relation to aid activities (attribution challenge)?
Results-based aid (RBA) aims to identify outputs or outcomes that can be measured and quantified, i.e. results that can be directly linked to development activities. RBA is a partnership between a development partner (donor) and a partner government (recipient). The key feature of RBA is the link between the aid intervention and strong incentives to encourage results. The main innovation of RBA is based on the introduction of a new conditionality concept: a contract between both partners that defines incentives to produce measurable results. If these results are achieved, the aid disbursement will be released.
The international debate on RBA is dealing with a variety of different approaches in the field of development finance. Depending on the definition of RBA, some practical experiences already exist. This applies, for example, to performance tranches in the context of budget support. In other types of RBA (such as the "cash on delivery" (CoD) concept introduced by the Center for Global Development), practical experience is still in its initial stages.
The potential benefits of RBA depend very much on the specific approach and design. The discussion on potential advantages and disadvantages of RBA indicates a number of conceptual weaknesses for those RBA approaches aiming at specific results ("standalone RBA approaches"). There might be a significant risk of misincentives and non-systematic strate-gies if aid focusses on only one measurable and quantitative result. In addition, there is a
Introduction
Results-based approaches play an important role in the current development-policy debate. For example, the term "results" is a crucial term of the outcome document of the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness from 2011. There are two aspects to this debate: on the one hand, further improving the effectiveness of development cooperation (aid) is important to the specialists; whereas on the other hand, many donors (parliaments, the public, etc.) continue to call for the justification of aid expenditures. This creates great pressure to give the most concrete evidence for the utility of aid budgets.
There are several examples of aid debates in the past where a results-focus was implicitly or explicitly an important dimension. The discussion on any principal-agent framework, for example, links aid directly to performance and results. This applies, for instance, to William Easterly's analysis "The white man's burden" (Easterly 2006) . A number of other theories, concepts and approaches are related to results as well. For instance, the discussion on country selectivity since the end of the 1990s is based on an implicit results-focus. The underlying idea was based on a model to reward good performing countries and to create additional incentives for performance (see, for example, Savedoff 2011a). In addition, attaching conditions to aid (conditionality) is also dealing directly with incentives for the implementation of policies and reforms (see, for example, Temple 2010).
The current international discussion 1 on practical results-based approaches differs from debates so far in as much as in practice, aid has been frequently inputs and progress oriented. For instance, approaches tend to be geared towards the allocation of funds for investment (e.g. to build schools) or providing advisory services (e.g. to the education sector), with no way of accounting for the success of such aid measures based on verifiable "results" (in the sense of outputs, outcomes or even impact). Success in aid is instead often recorded based on input or progress indicators, such as whether a country has raised its budget for education, or whether agreed upon reform documents (e.g. a general strategy for the education sector) have been adopted. Such an approach can indicate how the development activities in a partner country can be evaluated. But for two reasons its information value is limited: firstly, it is not always clear whether the intended results have actually been achieved. For instance, do a larger budget and the advice given really result in more pupils in schools? What about the quality of their education? Secondly, the question arises as to what role the development aid has had in the overall situation. If results were achieved, is there a cause-and-effect relation to aid activities (attribution challenge)?
be released. The key feature of RBA is the link between the aid intervention and strong incentives to encourage results. In addition, RBA reduces the implementation role and responsibility on the donor side and strengthens the domestic accountability on the partner side for policies that are under the control of the recipient. The main innovation of RBA is based on the introduction of a new conditionality concept: a contract between both partners that defines incentives to produce measurable results. If these results are achieved, the aid disbursement will be released; and if they are not, the aid disbursement will not take place.
RBA establishes a close link between aid disbursements and strong incentives to encourage development results. Approaches in this regard are intended to contribute to overcoming drawbacks of input-oriented official development assistance (ODA) such as "no clear result evidence line", heavy transaction costs of aid and the bypassing of national systems because of intensive use of donors' implementing capacities. 3 The debates on aid effectiveness -as presented in events in Paris, Accra and Busan -have a set of standards and principles in order to make aid more results-oriented. RBA is one major attempt to apply these aid effectiveness standards in a new model for aid relationships between development partners and partner countries. It is disputed in the debate whether RBA is able to overcome traditional aid weaknesses under real conditions and not create new or additional challenges (see, for example, Renzio / Woods 2008).
The present study provides an overview of the different types of results-based approaches with a strong focus on RBA and assesses broadly the applicability of these approaches to the governance sector. However, the study does not aim to repeat existing definition efforts (see, for example, Hennin / Rozema 2011; Pearson 2011).
The author experienced two main challenges in the course of conducting the study.
First, the precise focus of the study depends very much on the terminology. RBA (or similar terms) is sometimes used to introduce a new way of thinking and applying development cooperation. In a rigorous sense (such as with the cash on delivery concept of the Center for Global Development), possibilities for using the concept might be rather limited because of several requirements and preconditions (e.g. the capacity to implement policies and a strong public financial management system). Sometimes the term is used instead to adjust existing approaches more towards results orientation. In this case it might be more appropriate to stay with the original terminology instead of re-labelling existing types of aid in RBA.
Second, the concept of results-based aid was originally created in the context of social sectors and sometimes other areas of service delivery (access to tap water, etc.). The task of the present study to apply the concept to the governance sector is very plausible and desirable. But its application to the governance sector is much more complicated and, at least to some extent, not possible for a rigorous RBA approach.
The study focusses on RBA as well as its potential risks and weaknesses. Shortcomings, limitations and challenges that are relevant for other aid approaches are not discussed in the present paper.
The paper is partly based on work for a study on RBA commissioned by the Policy Division Governance of KfW Development Bank on behalf of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung / BMZ). The author has evaluated the international state of the art (research work, concept notes, etc.) and conducted a number of interviews with experts in Germany and abroad. The participation in events related to the subject (ODI workshop, 21 September 2011; OECD/DAC workshop in Berlin, 28-29 September 2011) has also contributed to the conceptual preparation of the paper. Together with the Center for Global Development (CGD) and the author on behalf of the German Development Institute (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / DIE) organised an international two-day expert workshop on results-based aid (Bonn, 18-19 April 2012) . Furthermore, colleagues of the CGD had kindly agreed to provide comments in the course of the study. 4 Even though the present study is limited to general considerations on RBA and governance, a number of interviews conducted for a case study on Malawi in September 2011 contributed to this general assessment on the use of RBA in the governance sector.
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Conceptual basis
This section provides an overview of the conceptual basis of results-based approaches in general and of results-based aid in particular. It then presents different individual concepts and concludes with a critical assessment of results-based aid.
Results-based approaches
Definitions
Terminology is a challenge in the debate on results-based approaches. The key feature of these approaches is that payments are only made once a pre-defined result is achieved. In this regard results-based approaches differ from other aid approaches where funds are used to finance specific inputs for achieving results (e.g. schools to improve education, medical equipment to improve the health situation of the population, etc.). Results-based approaches should not be confused with results orientation because many approaches that finance inputs are also oriented towards results and indeed do achieve these results.
Many terms and concepts are used in the context of the discussion of results-based approaches (output-based aid, performance-based aid, etc.). Nevertheless, there is a growing international consensus on definitions (see, for example, Pearson 2011; Hennin / Rozema 2011; Birdsall / Savedoff 2011) . Against this back¬ground, the understanding of RBA in the present study is as follows.
Results-based approaches -as a term -cover a number of different concepts. Two main subgroups can be distinguished: (i) results-based aid (RBA) and (ii) results-based financing (RBF).
(i) Results-Based Aid (RBA)
In general terms, RBA is a partnership between a development partner (donor) and a partner government (recipient). The main innovation of RBA is based on the introduction of a new conditionality concept: a contract between both partners that defines incentives to produce measurable results. Aid disbursements or non-disbursements are directly linked to these independently verified measures of results. If these results are achieved, the aid disbursement will be released; and if they are not, the aid disbursement will not take place. It is necessary to agree upon a "unit price" in advance (e.g. how much aid is provided per student passing the final exam). Donors are not involved in the implementation process ("hands off "). The CoD concept is one specific form of RBA. 5
(ii) Results-Based Financing (RBF)
In general terms, results-based financing (RBF) is based on a contract between an entity of the partner government and a service provider offering specific services. RBF schemes include different types of services to beneficiaries, such as conditional cash transfers and voucher schemes. As in the case of RBA, a "unit price" is needed. RBF is not necessarily an aid relationship between a development partner and a partner government. The funding for RBF schemes might come from aid or from the domestic resources of the partner country.
In principle, a combination of RBA and RBF (RBA/RBF hybrid) is possible and -at least to some extent -is being applied in several cases (see annex 2).
In addition to RBA and RBF, results-based management (RBM) is a crucial instrument for the implementation of results-focussed management, for example when it comes to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems or results-oriented budgeting approaches. RBM is characterised by its crosscutting focus and is used to mainstream results orientation. Managing for Development Results became one of the five principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
The study focusses on RBA; in contrast, RBF approaches take quite a different angle in this debate. Thus, they are not dealt with in detail in the present paper. The main rationale of RBA is based on the following three assumptions:
(i) RBA can facilitate progress on key results because of strong incentives.
(ii) RBA reduces transaction costs for aid. It requires fewer reporting processes; the national systems of the partner country concerned are used to a large extent. 
From inputs to results
The key characteristic of RBA is the link between aid intervention and strong incentives to encourage results. The main underlying assumption in this regard is as follows: in the past, ODA approaches focussed mainly on inputs or processes, and only in some cases on outputs. Examples of ODA interventions that are directly oriented towards results are rather rare.
To illustrate this kind of concept, the following example will be used to explain the main arguments.
Typical ODA interventions, for example in the education sector, focus on the provision of inputs necessary to achieve a desired result. Inputs in this regard might be to provide advice to the Ministry of Education in order to develop a new educational concept or a strategy for increasing school enrolment rates. On the investment side, an input-based intervention might be the funding of new primary schools or establishing a specific target for a minimum share of the education budget in the total national budget (e.g. in the context of sector budget support). However, providing inputs does not always lead to the desired results, for example even with a lot of consultancies and investment in school buildings, the school enrolment rates and the individual educational achievements of children might not increase. Reasons for this might be incentives on a household level to keep children at home or a ministry in charge of education that has had no real political will to implement an effective sector policy that ensures that schools are staffed with adequately trained teachers and equipped with teaching materials. And even if the enrolment rate did improve after the donor intervention, it might not be possible to determine whether this success can be attributed to the donor intervention or whether it would have taken place as well without the donor support.
RBA tries to deal specifically with this challenge. At least on the level of the concept, the link between the donor intervention and the aspired objective in terms of measurable results is close, since the donor intervention might provide strong incentives for results.
In the present paper, results are defined as the direct and indirect effects of inputs and activities. We can distinguish between different levels of results. Outputs are normally technical results (for example, a newly constructed school). This output might lead to the next level: outcomes (for example, increase in enrolment rates because new school facilities are available).
The most ambitious level of results is impact. Impacts are defined as the wider developmental effects (for example, poverty reduction because of improved educational outcomes).
In reality it might be difficult to always make a clear distinction between different categories of an impact chain. For example, depending on the point of view, an increase of a sector budget share might be defined as an input (e.g. to give more priority to a sector). 6 At the same time, the increase of a sector budget share might be also regarded as a result. This result might be seen as an input on the next higher level of a strategy.
Results orientation and results management in the framework of aid might be feasible in many regards. On a technical level, aid agencies have developed a number of tools for focussing on results (see, e.g. World Bank 2011a, 35; CoP-MfDR 2011). Examples include results-focus in strategies, results-oriented planning and operations tools, and M&E systems focussing on results.
Structure of RBA approaches
Results-based aid is organised mainly in three steps.
The first step of RBA is the preparation and finalisation of a contract between a development partner and the partner government. This step is crucial in several respects. (i) Both contract partners have to identify an area / sector / subsector or a specific objective that is important for the development process of the country and suitable for RBA at the same time. The selection Source: own compilation 6 "Finally, results could be defined in terms of inputs (e.g. allocating a minimum share of the budget to h
Results (defined in a donor / recipient contract)
Disbursement if results are verified Measures by partner country to achieve results
results could be defined in terms of inputs (e.g. allocating a minimum share of the budget to health,
as is often the case in budget support mechanisms)" (Pearson 2011, 4) .
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) process presents several challenges. For example, social sectors such as education and health quite often receive more donor support than other sectors. If reasonable support in a given sector is available, it might be difficult to identify a relevant "result" on the one hand, and a situation where substitution of RBA supports by another development partner would not be a challenge, on the other hand. For instance, if a donor is, in principle, ready to substitute non-disbursement from another donor in case of non-performance, the incentives of RBA will be diluted. Other important aspects are related to the duration of the contract and the sustainability prospects of the supported area (e.g. the question of how the partner country is going to deal with the situation if and when donor support comes to an end).
(ii) The contract partners have to agree upon a measurable result and an appropriate indicator or set of indicators. Baseline data has to be available or collected. The data collection and data analysing process for the future have to be agreed upon. (iii) A "price per unit of progress" has to be identified. In addition, the contract partners have to discuss and agree upon a performance level for results that is appropriate (At what level do we reward, for example, "additional" students passing the final exam? Is the level achieved last year an appropriate starting point, or should we use an average of the last few years? etc.). 7
The second step is characterised by the implementation of the activities that are necessary to achieve the results. The nature of the activities might be different. One major bottleneck might be inadequate funding for a task, and the government might now be willing to provide more resources. Perhaps insufficient capacity is a major obstacle and the government would now agree to take specific remedial action (additional staff, training for staff, implementation of a retention strategy, etc.). Other possible drawbacks might be related to an overall power game within the government. However, since aid disbursement now depends on results, it might have an impact on internal decision-making processes. All in all, the partner country is in charge of the whole implementation process.
The third step is an assessment of the progress made. This should normally be done by a third party in order to ensure high-quality and incontestable data. The data will serve as the basis for the calculation (price per unit of progress) of the aid disbursement, since incremental progress is to be rewarded. The progress assessment is to be done on a regular basis (e.g. annually).
Intersections between RBA and PBA Programme-based approaches (PBA) and RBA can be interpreted as both aid instruments and aid modalities. When understood as aid instruments, there can be a great degree of overlap between PBA and RBA. When seen as aid modalities, their premises and priorities might differ.
• Aid instruments (instrumental way of providing aid): PBA instruments that are used in a results-based manner (performance tranches in budget support, etc.) are mostly congruent with an RBA approach. Equally, RBA ventures that are based on joint donor approaches and a common approach to finance are almost identical to PBA.
• Aid modalities (set of norms that ODA practice is based on): when seen as aid modalities, PBA and RBA do not automatically adhere to a common set of priorities (specifically the international standards that developed based on the Paris Declaration). This can result in conflicting goals (e.g. harmonisation vs. orientation towards results). 
RBA sector-specific considerations
Typically, RBA approaches such as CoD are associated with interventions in social sectors (often education and health) and sometimes with interventions concerning other direct service delivery activities (such as access to tap water). These intervention areas have some specific features:
• It is rather easy to identify development results. In many areas, reference can be made to international and national objectives (e.g. Millennium Development Goals or national poverty reduction strategies) and / or international standards.
• These results are measurable.
• Data and baseline information is available, or rather easy to collect. High additional transaction costs can normally be avoided.
• Intense disputes between the different parties around the definition of results, the indicators, the applied methods and data are not expected.
The application of RBA in other areas seems to be more demanding. A more detailed discussion of the practicability regarding the area of governance is presented in section 2.3.
Conclusions: assessment and critical aspects of RBA
In general terms, the international debate is dealing with a number of different RBA cases on different levels. Some approaches are not presenting new ways to organise aid but rather offer advancements in existing instruments; this applies, for example, to the variable tranches as part of the European Union's general and sector budget support. Other approaches are much more focussed on a specific result. This applies, for example, to the CoD concept, which is in reality still in its infancy.
Against the background of ongoing aid debates, some general considerations can be discussed concerning RBA -considerations that might be relevant for one specific RBA type but not for another (see Klingebiel 2011b). 9
9 The list of potential advantages and disadvantages should not be read as a list that always applies to all types of RBA. The identified advantages / disadvantages might, of course, also apply (in some cases even to a larger extent) to other aid approaches.
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Box 1: RBA: closing the accountability gap?
Stephan Klingebiel
Accountability is of considerable interest in the context of the debate on more effective development cooperation. In general terms, accountability is the obligation of a person, group or institution to justify decisions or actions taken. It is associated with sanctions in the event of compliance / non-compliance and is therefore based on incentives. Accountability is relevant in three respects: -accountability on the part of the donor; -accountability in partner countries (domestic accountability); -mutual accountability between partner and donor. Accountability on the part of the donor (in the case of a bilateral donor; but in the case of multilateral donors, the structure of accountability is sometimes arranged differently) and in partner countries concerns, in particular, parliaments, the electorate, civil society and national audit offices. In the debate on effective aid (i.e. the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action, and the Busan Partnership document), mutual accountability as well as accountability to the actual target groups in partner countries play particularly vital roles. The aforementioned levels of accountability do not automatically complement each other. In some cases, they may even compete. Challenges are encountered especially in the following respects. In the past the (implicit) focus was on the accountability of aid recipients to donors. Conceptually, this changed primarily with the debates on aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration, etc.); however, the new concepts have yet to be fully implemented. This donor-oriented focus detracts from the effectiveness of aid (risk-aversion, bypassing of partners' national systems, functioning "project islands", donors' implementation interests, etc.). Any emphasis placed by development policy on accountability in partner countries themselves is often confronted with structures in the various countries that do not function satisfactorily (weak roles played by parliament and the media, etc.). Partner governments do not necessarily have an interest in functioning accountable systems in their own countries, since they may be associated with demands for governance reforms. In some cases, mutual accountability is costly, entails numerous compromises and has shortcomings. This is true, for example, of coordinated national development strategies and of joint monitoring approaches and policy analyses. It is possible, in principle, to identify ways of strengthening accountability in the aid context. To begin with, functioning public financial management systems (including budgetary planning processes and value-for-money auditing) are a justified concern of partner countries and their actors. The principles underlying aid effectiveness wisely focus on partner countries' national systems; not the least important aspect of this is that it increases the importance of parliaments, civil society actors, etc. Where the donors are concerned, there continues to be considerable room for improvement. Aid can help to strengthen accountability systems and to reduce unintended effects likely to weaken them. External actors are primarily able to support the "supply" of accountability, but are less capable on the "demand" side. Donors have a legitimate and serious desire for accountability in their own countries. That accountability is essential if political and societal backing is to be gained for the provision of public funds for development-policy tasks. As a general rule, a distinction should be made in this context between the sometimes complex -and frequently abstract -development cooperation systems and effect chains (in which donor administrations and the appropriate parliamentary bodies must have an interest) on the one hand, and the legitimate need for transparency and information for a wider public on the other. Results-based approaches to development cooperation can, in principle, strengthen mutual and national (in the partner country) accountability, since both forms are based on the partners' implementation of policies and their activities; this may also concern M&E systems, which are very important for accountability.
Potential advantages of results-based aid:
• Action is directly aimed at providing incentives for results: the behaviour of all actors (development partners as well as partner governments) is significantly influenced by the results. There are direct links between the aid interventions and incentives (which might lead to results); the benefits might be more immediate and quantifiable.
• Incentives for performance: the input of aid creates incentives to perform for the partner country. This performance orientation can have a spillover effect into other sectors of the partner country.
• Strengthened ownership on the part of the partners / partner government responsible for implementation: the task of achieving the goals lies with the partner government. The donors have no responsibility for implementation. This strengthens the partners' political and administrative systems. At the same time, the approach might be supportive of more mutual accountability.
• Better verification of the results of aid: closing the "attribution gap" (proving a direct causality of aid measures and incentives that lead to results) might be more successful in specific cases. This can help the donor countries to demonstrate the concrete benefits of aid (visibility of the development partner). However, there might be a risk of "short-sighted attributions" even in those cases where results were reached; RBA does not lead to an easy and automatic attribution of results to aid interventions.
Possible disadvantages and limitations of RBA:
• Responsiveness of the partner's political system to incentives: the concept assumes that the partners are open to incentives to perform better. This applies to those partner countries that show a strong performance orientation ("good performers"), or at least where there are areas of access, such as in specific, viable institutions ("pockets of effectiveness", see Roll 2011).
However, literature provides evidence -especially regarding low-income and high aid-dependent countries -where those favourable conditions are nonexistent or only partly assured. Particularly, research on political systems in a number of sub-Saharan African countries shows evidence for systemic nonperformance in core areas of service delivery (see, e.g., Walle 2005; Chabal / Daloz 1999).
• Misincentives, unintended consequences and non-systemic strategies: generally speaking, there is a danger of misincentives; a strong focus on a specific outcome might tend to result in non-systemic analysis and strategy. The pressure to achieve certain goals can thus lead to the neglect of other priorities in the same sector. Indicators that might not be entirely suitable to this approach jeopardise the implementation of policies that are too heavily focussed on quantitative goals.
• Capacity: the approach implies that the partner countries have the capacity to achieve the results. If their capacities and their public financial management system are deficient, this does not seem realistic.
• Sectors and data: results-based aid cannot be implemented equally well in all sectors. Social sectors, such as education and health, as well as sectors with infrastructure services that can more easily be measured (transport, public water supply, etc.), are quite qualified. In other sectors it may be harder to measure these results or to come to an agreement on them with the partner countries (such as complicated agreements on good governance), and the direct effects cannot always be clearly shown as wider outcomes. This applies, for example, to various areas of public financial management. This approach may further create an incentive to manipulate data.
• Losing entry points for policy dialogue / de-linking (some) RBA approaches and the political context: where RBA approaches involve an automatic mechanism for payment following the achievement of certain goals, difficulties might arise if a development partner were forced to pay out, even if faced with an unfavourable political environment, including massive governance problems (such as serious human rights abuses). RBA is not an instrument to expand possibilities for policy dialogue.
• Insufficient pre-financing capacities / "financial hijacking": in the context of this approach, pre-financing by the partner country is intended, or even necessary. Because of very tight budgets in a number of low-income countries, this could be a major hurdle. 10 There is the further risk that other aid resources in a country might be redirected to this end.
• Fiduciary risks: RBA risks might be similar to programme-based approaches (such as budget support or pooled funding mechanisms) in terms of fiduci-10 In this case, it could be possible to develop schemes for start-up financing.
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Box 2: Distortion risks -possible unintended effects
Whether incentives might do good or harm depends very much on the specific setting in a country. For example, normally we assume that an increase of available resources at the local level can contribute significantly to development. Money can be spent in accordance with local needs and priorities. Decisionmaking processes in close cooperation with the people might improve participation. However, if an increase in resource transfers to the local level is considered by local or national elites as available "rents", it might just create conflicts over "access to rents". If local structures are not prepared for -and experienced in -managing an increase in resource transfers, this approach might also fail because of limited capacities on the ground. If aid provides strong incentives for an increase in own resources (local taxes, etc.), this might also contribute to serious problems (for example, for small businesses), because inexperienced staff on the local level push very much for local revenues that, for example, affect farmers who sell their products. These possible distortion risks might not always be relevant, and quite often "more resources" for the local level can contribute in a positive way to the development. However, possible risks and side-effects should be given attention if an aid approach provides a lot of incentives for reforms and changes.
ary challenges. Since aid disbursements are not tied to specific activities or procurement procedures, fiduciary risks might be a relevant challenge.
• Time horizon: RBA can create a shortened perspective, because it might cause only those results to be considered that can be achieved quickly. Results that can only be achieved in the medium or long term might clash with short-term political rationales (desire for re-election, etc.).
• Factors out of the government's control: in those cases where results agreed upon are not reached because of factors not under control of the government, the effect of incentives for performance vanishes because disbursement of RBA funds does not take place, regardless of how development-oriented the government acts. For example, if there is a strong need to cut a budget because of the overall economic situation (due to an international crisis situation or unfavourable terms of trade), there might also be the need to reduce the budget line, which is an important measure to reach the intended results.
•
Danger of non-ambitious results:
whether results are realistic or unrealistic is probably quite often vague. Since partner countries and donor agencies have an interest in disbursing the rewards, there might be an implicit tendency to identify less ambitious results.
Some limitations and technical challenges mentioned above might be tackled. For example, in those cases where insufficient pre-funding capacity would not allow the use of RBA, an adjustment of the approach is reasonable. In this case several options might be considered. (i) The donor could set up a system where (a partial) pre-funding is provided, for example for the first expected cycle of results. However, this course of action might contribute to a significant reduction in the intended incentive and pose a challenge if results are not achieved (How to organise reimbursement in case of non-performance? Is this procedure really enforceable?, etc.).
(ii) Another option might be the reimbursement of the paid interest in those cases where the recipient borrows from the capital market in order to be able to make the necessary investments. However, even if a reimbursement was agreed upon in advance, there might be other effects on the recipient's budget (e.g. due to borrowing limits set by the IMF).
Further provisions might be included in order to specifically support the capacity aspects and the reliability of data; regulations in this regard are included, for example, in the new World Bank approach. An upfront investment earmarked for building the capacities of the concerned institutions could be integrated into RBA. This amount could be provided in advance and spent in line with an agreed approach (such as tendering of capacity-building activities in the specific area). A similar approach might be used in order to improve the quality of data needed; for example requiring an agreed amount or share of aid to be used to ensure the regular provision of reliable data.
Regarding RBA, there seems to be a rather high probability of a low disbursement level due to poor or non-performance (at least in those cases where ambitious targets were set). On the one hand, the possibility of partial or non-disbursement is an important feature of RBA. It is the in-tention of the approach to establish a strong link between performance and the provision of aid. If the aid amount is finally made available to the partner country in some way, even in case of non-performance, there might be an adverse impact on the incentive structure from the beginning. On the other hand, partial or non-disbursement is a crucial challenge for the partner country in terms of predictability of aid. 11 In addition, such a situation might also lead to challenges for the donor (aid management) and to questions about the impact of the country strategy. For example, if the government of the partner country is not able to perform (i.e. to provide results in accordance with the RBA agreement) due solely to the background of exceptionally unfavourable international conditions (reduced budget because of adverse international market prices for relevant commodities), the donor might be under pressure not to add further burdens to the situation of the country.
RBA in the area of good governance
The discussion on RBA does not provide many ideas on the sectoral areas of intervention. Implicitly, preference is given to education, health and some other areas for direct service delivery on a household basis (such as access to energy and tap water).
On the contrary, the international debate does not pay much attention to governance or good governance as a possible area for RBA interventions.
The term "governance"
The debate on the meaning and content of governance is complex and not a new one. 12 For the purpose of the present study, governance is defined in the following way:
"Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. " 13
In addition to this definition, it is useful to mention that there is also an emerging consensus on the term "good governance". Against this background, the term indicates that the governance concept is based on universal human rights and the principles derived from it:
"We talk about good governance when state actors and institutions earnestly endeavour to frame policies in such a way that they are pro-poor, sustainable and in line with the MDGs.
(…) A state acts in a development-oriented manner if it respects and protects all human rights and earnestly endeavours to fulfil them for all its citizens (…). Its action is guided by democratic and rule-of-law principles. (…) The state should be capable of managing conflicts constructively and non-violently. Key elements are the efficiency and transparency of state administration" (BMZ 2009, 6).
More specifically, it is helpful to identify concrete areas of governance. The widely accepted and used Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project 14 distinguishes between five dimensions:
• Voice and Accountability 
RBA and governance-specific issues
There are a number of sector-specific issues for the application of RBA in the context of governance:
(i) Defining agreeable results between donors and partner governments in the governance sector might be difficult -at least in some areas -because of the political sensitivity and the low likelihood of reaching a consensus between the contract parties. Against the background that RBA depends on non-disputable results and independently verifiable indicators, this might be a challenge. This issue might be relevant, for example, with regard to a result related to political governance dimensions, such as "voice and accountability"; a number of concepts use more specific governance dimensions such as "protection and fulfillment of all human rights" or "democracy" (see, e.g., BMZ 2009).
In other areas of governance, it might be easier to agree on aspired results. There might be rather promising entry points for RBA, especially in two areas: (a) administrative reform and decentralisation; (b) public financial management.
(ii) Particularly in comparison with the social sectors such as education and health, the definition of a plausible development result might be more difficult in some areas of governance because of technical reasons. For example, we can define an increase in generating own revenues on the local level as a result of an intervention. However, this result might be more disputable than a result from the social sector (school enrolment) regarding its final developmental impact. For instance, it might still be a basic question as to whether an increase of resources on the local level will really be used for developmental purposes or whether the central level is reducing its contributions to the local level because of new means of income. Especially the social sectors have the advantage of being able to provide a chain of evidence for direct benefits of individuals on the outcome (results) level. On the opposite side, governance deals with the question of how decisions are taken and policies are framed and implemented in a state. This is essential for any development efforts, but to a certain extent less tangible in terms of "final beneficiaries".
(iii) Several governance results are difficult to measure, at least in some areas (again, especially with regard to political governance issues) (see, e.g., Garcia 2011; Arndt / Oman 2006). There are a growing number of governance indicators that are similar to the World Governance Indicators compiled by the World Bank. Nevertheless, several difficulties remain: (a) there are hardto-measure governance areas such as "human rights"; (b) they are quite often disputed (e.g. indicators on "political freedom"); (c) frequently, the available data is outdated and does not reflect the present situation (or account for the present administration and government in charge of policies). At least in part, these challenges are less relevant for some indicators with regard to decentralisation and public financial management (PFM).
(iv) RBA is not a tool to compensate precisely for the costs that are needed in order to achieve the intended results. "Thus, the COD Aid payment is not really aimed at covering the cost of schooling. It is aimed at relaxing constraints that hold back progress. " (Birdsall / Savedoff 2011, 53) A basic consideration of the CoD approach is to provide a sufficient incentive, but at the same time to provide enough resources, for example, to expand existing programmes (such as teacher training, school construction). Therefore, the "payment per unit of progress" is not an exact measure for the investments needed.
In principle, this assumption is also useful for the governance sector. In some governance areas, we can expect a clear need for resources, for example, in the area of decentralisation (e.g. provision of funding for local infrastructure). At the same time, some governance results are not strongly -or only to a small degree -related to the need for resources (e.g., more effective procurement regulations in order to strengthen the PFM system). In this case the "payment per unit of progress" would be primarily a reward or incentive to perform. Therefore, a payment per unit of progress can provide an essential incentive to implement related policies, even in a case where funding might be not an essential bottleneck to achieve the intended results.
RBA governance results and indicators
In principle, the identification of results and related indicators for RBA should be deducted from a specific country situation. However, with regard to areas of governance, it might be useful to consider the following general options.
Public Financial Management
Result: improved PFM system Indicator: PEFA scoring
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment framework has established itself as an internationally renowned analytical tool (see Klingebiel / Mahn 2011) . Being a standardised approach, PEFA enables an overview of trends to be obtained at comparable intervals on the basis of 28 indicators. The PEFA assessment could be used in two regards: (a) an improved assessment could be defined as a result; (b) the assessment of the 28 indicatorsor a subset thereof -can serve at the same time to measure the performance on an incremental basis.
For example, the outcome of the latest PEFA assessment (excluding the three indicators for "donor practices") could serve as the baseline. A reward system for changes to future PEFA assessments could be created in the following way.
Each PEFA score is equal to a "translated score": The sums of "translated scores" for the baseline PEFA assessment and the new PEFA assessment would be calculated. A positive change from the baseline to the actual situation would be rewarded. An agreement on RBA for improved PEFA scores could provide for a reward in the amount of X euros for each additional point in the next (or second or third) PEFA assessment. To make sure that, at least in theory, a very significant improvement is rewarded, a rather ambitious maximum should be calculated (e.g. up to 20 points can be rewarded).
A strong advantage is the high reputation of the PEFA assessment for the overall PFM situation in a country. 16 In addition, it would be possible to focus on a smaller number of specific PEFA indicators if attention were given to a specific issue. Disadvantages are mainly related to the intervals. Only in some cases are PEFA assessments done every second year. More often, an interval of once every three years (or even less frequent) is chosen. However, a reward system could provide an incentive to establish a regular two-year interval.
Procurement
Result: improved procurement system (completion, value for money and controls in procurement)
Indicator: PEFA Indicator 19 measures three dimensions: (i) use of open completion for awarding of contracts that exceed the nationally established monetary threshold for small purchases, (ii) justification for the use of less competitive procurement methods, (iii) existence and operation of a procurement complaints mechanism.
Advantage: procurement is a crucial and sensitive dimension of a PFM system. In several countries it might be an advantage to select this specific PFM issue. PEFA measures the status in a comprehensive way (three different aspects). Disadvantage: information is only available in accordance with regular PEFA intervals. However, it might be feasible to collect information in accordance to the PEFA methodology on a regular basis (e.g. annually) by an independent, certified PEFA consultant.
External auditing
Result: improved external auditing (scope, nature and follow-up of external audit)
Indicator: PEFA Indicator 26 measures scope, nature and follow-up of external audits
Advantage: a functioning external auditing mechanism is a key pillar for PFM systems. The related PEFA indicator covers several relevant aspects in this regard, including the coverage, timeliness and follow-up on audit recommendations. Disadvantage: information is only available in accordance with the regular PEFA interval. However, it should be feasible to have information collected in accordance with the PEFA methodology on a regular basis (e.g. annually) by an independent, certified PEFA consultant.
Domestic revenues
Result: increase of domestic resources Indicator: Option 1: tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic products (GDP)
Option 2: increase in domestic revenues (percentage change) Advantage (depending on the level of domestic resources respective of the tax / GDP ratio): efforts to increase domestic resources are important for development processes in two ways. (i) The size of the national budget can be extended. Additional resources are available for development investments.
(ii) The use of domestic resources contributes to an improved domestic accountability system in a country and a stronger role of citizens and parliaments (and their budget functions). Normally, the data is available; this information is provided by national revenue authorities and confirmed by IMF missions. Disadvantages: qualitative aspects (impact of revenue efforts on the poor population / vulnerable groups; effects on the private sector, etc.) are important, but are mostly not reflected by the indicator; it might be possible to partly address some distributional issues, for example, through periodic independent reports on tax incidence by income group. The ratio might be affected significantly by factors (partly) outside the control of a government. At least in some cases, reliability of data (e.g. data for GDP) might be a critical issue.
Decentralisation
Result: increase of resources available on the subnational level 17
Indicator: Option 1: average transfer payment to subnational level per inhabitant
Option 2: local expenditure as share of total government expenditure Advantages: many subnational governments are lacking sufficient resources, since central governments are frequently reluctant to furnish the local level in particular with unconditional resources. Disadvantages: low resources often mean reduced capacity to manage a budget cycle in many regards. An increase in resources might have negative side effects (such as distorting and negative effects on local incentive structures); it is difficult to assess the outcome of higher amounts of available resources for the local level.
Economic governance
Result: improved economic governance Indicator: calculations based on "Doing Business" data RBA might be applicable in order to provide incentives to improve economic governance. The Doing Business reports prepared by the International Finance Corporation can be used in two ways 18 : (a) an assessment indicating progress of a country by the data of the report could be defined as a result (not the ranking, but the changing performance of a country over time); (b) the data of the report can serve at the same time as a measurement of the performance (indicator).
One advantage is the availability of data and the annual reassessment. The report measures core dimensions of economic governance and has a favourable international reputation. Disadvantages are the methodological challenges related to the indicator. As with many other indicators, the indicator has methodological weaknesses because a fictitious enterprise (with specific features) serves as an example. In addition, the assessments are conducted on the basis of expert opinions. This fictitious case only partially reflects the reality of a country.
17 The rationale to support decentralisation processes (depending on a specific country setting) is mainly as follows: in terms of political participation and service delivery (access to administrative services, health services, etc.), the local level is crucial in many countries. If aid can provide incentives to strengthen the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the local level, people outside urban centres and vulnerable groups would benefit in particular. 18 See the KfW memo on "Aid on Delivery, Ansätze im Bereich ökonomische Governance zur Verbesserung des Investitionsklimas in Sub-Sahara Afrika" (5 May 2011).
Statistics / M&E systems
Result: functioning and reliable national statistics systems / M&E system Indicator: country-specific Advantages: in principle, an important precondition for reliable planning and decision-making processes. Disadvantages: no appropriate general indicator available. National statistics offices, ministries of planning, etc., are heavily dependent on a number of data providers. It might be difficult to provide specific incentives for improved results.
Conclusions
General conclusions on RBA
The international debate on RBA is dealing with a variety of different approaches in the field of development aid. The spectrum ranges from a more results-oriented approach in the area of budget support (macro and sectoral levels) to new types of projects that are intended to push one specific result (sub-sectoral level or "one result"-specific RBA). All approaches have one common feature: they try to create incentives in order to make results happen.
Results-Based Aid (RBA)
From the perspective of the author of the present study, the potential benefits of RBA depend very much on the specific approach and design. For example, experiences with performance tranches in the context of budget support indicate a reasonable approach. There is little experience with regard to "one result"-specific projects.
The discussion on potential advantages and disadvantages of RBA indicates a number of conceptual weaknesses, at least for some RBA approaches. There might be a significant risk for misincentives and non-systematic strategies if aid focusses too heavily on one measurable and quantitative result.
In addition, there is a clear bias of RBA approaches in favour of performing countries. The likelihood of "good performance" (reaching results) is much more pronounced in those cases where countries have good leadership structure, planning and implementation capacity, and a functioning public financial management system.
Conclusions on RBA and the governance sector
Possibilities for identifying measurable and quantifiable results are rather good in social sectors and several (basic) infrastructure-related topics. The governance sector is, in general terms, less favourable in this regard. "Political governance" issues such as political freedom or human rights do not seem to be suitable for RBA approaches. However, some other governance areas have the potential to be included; this applies especially to public financial management and fiscal decentralisation. There might also be some potential for economic governance topics and in the area of statistics / M&E systems.
RBA might be regarded as a potential approach to dealing with countries not suitable for budget support or other pooling arrangements. In those settings where a country has a comparably "mixed" or even "insufficient" record (e.g. because of the political governance performance or high fiduciary risks), the following aspects might apply:
• RBA standalone approaches of one donor might be inappropriate, especially in challenging settings. Frequent and close collaboration with other development partners might be essential. There is a strong need to work closely together with other donors in order to have an influential and constructive dialogue with partner governments. Any attempt to focus just on a few specific issues might be difficult in a complex situation; harmonised and sector-oriented strategies are important also in the context of RBA approaches.
• Countries might show a low level of "incentive receptivity" and limited opportunities for "pockets of effectiveness". RBA relies on "driving forces" for reforms in the government structure, including at the top level. If government structures are not receptive to performance orientation, the likelihood of failure (non-performance) is high. In principle, one could think about some niches of government where this approach might work and could have spillover effects, at best. However, since the governance situation dominates all public structures, the scope is very limited.
• A challenging country situation might be due to high fiduciary risks in all important areas. This is a major limitation, since RBA approaches rely on the use of national systems.
• At present, there are few possible entry points for RBA; this applies to some activities in the area of PFM. Most important are the harmonised and sectororiented strategies. A "standalone RBA" approach (e.g. outside the sectoral discussions) is not recommended. Any concept for RBA should be prepared closely / jointly with other major development partners in the sector.
the desired results, and the scope for system-strengthening measures and other improvements.
(ii) Disburses upon achievement of results and performance indicators, not inputs. Disbursements will finance the defined borrower programmes that are designed to achieve the programme's specific results. Disbursements will be pooled with funds from other sources (including government and development partners) and will not be attributable to individual transactions. Disbursements will be determined by reference to progress on monitorable and verifiable performance indicators, rather than by whether expenditure has been incurred.
(iii) Focusses on strengthening the institutional governance, capacity and systems that are essential to ensuring that the programmes achieve their expected results and can be sustained. A priority area for both preparation and implementation support will be to strengthen the institutional capacity of the pro gramme's own systems, and thereby enhance development impact and sustainability. This will include focussing on transparency, accountability, participation and other governance aspects of the programme.
(iv) Provides assurance that World Bank financing is used appropriately and that the environmental and social impacts of the programme are adequately addressed. The World Bank will assess the programme's fiduciary and environmental and social management systems and, as necessary, will agree with the government on additional measures needed to provide reasonable assurance that the loan proceeds are used for programme expenditures, that these expenditures are incurred with economy and efficiency, and that the affected people and the environment are protected.
Development-policy lending will remain the primary Work Bank instrument for supporting policy actions to achieve a country's overall development objectives, with rapidly disbursing general budget support to help address overall development financing needs. Investment lending will remain the Bank's main instrument to support projects, with disbursement against specific expenditures and transactions. Program-for-Results will be the instrument of choice when the objective is to support the performance of a government programme using the government's own systems; when the results require expenditures; and when the risks to achieving the programme's objectives relate to the governance and capacity of the systems to achieve better results, including with respect to fiduciary, environmental and social issues.
The MDG Contract of the European Commission 20
The MDG Contract is a longer-term, more predictable form of general budget support that the European Commission (EC) launched in a number of countries at the start of EDF (European Development Fund) 10. It is part of the Commissions' response to international commitments to provide more predictable assistance to developing countries.
The five key features are as follows (Birdsall / Savedoff 2011, 17-20) :
(i) The donor makes payments for outcomes, not inputs. The outcome(s) must be agreed between the donor and the recipient. It must also be measurable and continuous, making it possible to reward incremental progress. At no point does the donor specify or monitor inputs.
(ii) The donor embraces a hands-off approach. A donor may make available, or help obtain, other resources for technical assistance, ideally in a pooled fund. But it is up to the recipient to choose whether to contract for technical help and advice from any party.
(iii) The progress towards the agreed outcome is independently verified by a third party. Progress is the trigger for payments. So, both donor and recipient must have confidence in the way progress is measured.
(iv) Transparency is achieved by publicity disseminating the content of the CoD contract itself, the amount of progress, and the payment for each increment of progress. The indicator or measure should be as simple as possible.
(v) CoD complements other aid programmes. It could be introduced in addition to current aid flows without disrupting ongoing programmes.
The government of the partner country has full discretion on the use of the CoD contribution. Therefore, the donor contribution is not tied to specific activities, reforms or purchases.
From the perspective of CoD protagonists, the approach has a number of significant advantages. First of all, it provides a strong incentive to perform. Secondly, domestic accountability is encouraged. The recipient government is accountable for the implementation; the performance of the government is transparent to the citizens. Thirdly, since a "hands-off approach" is essential, the approach directly supports the institutions and capacities of the partner country. Finally, CoD can work in most low-income countries, including fragile states. Since CoD provides a strong incentive -especially in the poorer and more aid-dependent countries -the benefits are likely to be the greatest in this country group.
Just to illustrate how the concept should be applied to a specific situation, the following example, normally used by the CGD, might be useful (Birdsall / Savedoff 2011, 45-65) .
A CoD contract includes four essential elements:
(i) A shared and clearly defined goal. For example: children complete primary education of good quality in country X.
(ii) A unit for measuring progress. For example: "assessed completer": a student who is enrolled in the last year of primary school and who takes an approved standardised test.
(iii) Payment per unit of progress. For example: the donor agrees to pay US$ 20 for each student who takes a standardised test in the last year of primary school up to the total enrolment in the base year and US$ 200 for each assessed completer in excess of that number.
(iv) A system for measuring and verifying progress. For example: the recipient government commits to disseminating its information on student enrolments, assessed completers and disaggregated test scores. The donor commits to contracting a third party to verify the accuracy of the recipient's reports.
DFID's RBA pilots
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) is in the process of preparing four different RBA pilots 21 :
(i) CoD in Ethiopia in education (results: additional girls / students passing exams)
(ii) RBA in Rwanda in education (results: additional students completing primary school and passing a secondary (S3) exam) (iii) RB (results-based) public private partnership (PPP) in health (results: pregnant women and children provided with health care) (iv) RB-PPP in India for climate change (results: number of poor households provided with clean energy)
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
The MCC forms partnerships with some of the world's poorest countries, but only those committed to:
• good governance
• economic freedom
• investments in their citizens MCC provides these well-performing countries with large-scale grants to fund country-led solutions for reducing poverty through sustainable economic growth. MCC grants complement other US and international development programmes. There are two primary types of MCC grants: compacts and threshold programmes.
• Compacts are large, five-year grants for countries that pass MCC's eligibility criteria.
• Threshold programmes are smaller grants awarded to countries that come close to passing these criteria and are firmly committed to improving their policy performance.
MCC is managed by a chief executive officer, who is part of the nine-member Board of Directors. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the US Trade Representative, and the USAID Administrator serve on the board along with four private-sector representatives.
